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ABSTRACT
While the World Trade Organisation and Regional Trade Agreements work for boosting the glo-
bal trade, trade protection remains prevalent. This contradiction took a new turn during the
2007/2008 global financial and economic crisis. There has been an argument that trade protec-
tionist activities are influenced by diverse factors, including social, economic and institutional fac-
tors. This study examines what determines trade protectionist actions, taking into consideration
some macro-economic variables. The data were sourced from the Global Trade Alert and World
Development Indicators. The authors find that a country's level of economic growth is not a cru-
cial factor for engaging in trade protection. It is also interesting that as a country's institutional
quality improves, there might be the less protectionist tendencies. This implies that a country's
magnitude of protection is determined by its level of institutional development. The other find-
ing includes that the more a country trades, the higher its tendency to protect.
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1. Introduction
The proponents of free trade advocate for the minimisation of the restrictions to global trade in favour of access
to the global market. This is evidenced by the number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) across the world
(Osabuohien, Efobi, & Beecroft, 2014; World Trade Organization, 2012). The quest for cooperation among countries
with a view to enhancing mutual benefits and economic growth are some of the goals of the WTO and Regional
Trade Agreements (RTAs). Similarly, the world trade system (WTS) was indoctrinated with a consensus towards
free trade of goods and services and the mutual cooperation of countries, to enhance trading capacities
(Osabuohien, Efobi, Odebiyi, & Fayomi, 2017).
Despite the drive to achieve more trade among countries, proponents of protectionism advocate for national
interest and economic welfare through regulating imports and market entry of goods from other countries. Some
of the protectionist policies include tariff bounds, rules of origin in some cases, bans and quotas. Evidence reveals
that the number of protective actions implemented by countries after the global financial and economic crises
has drastically increased (Evenett, 2014; Osabuohien et al., 2014). By this action, it is presumed that the protecting
country is able to foster national agenda at the expense of access to goods produced by other countries.
Irrespective of a country’s orientation towards trade (in terms of free trading or protectionism), there are pros and
cons that are attributable to each of these trade orientations. For instance, free trading activities will enhance
competition, consumer welfare, among others, while the issue of dumping and death of indigenous industries
may arise.
On the other hand, the benefits of free trading will be regressed, while the demerits will be advanced, under
protectionism (Boffa & Olarreaga, 2012). The relativity to glide towards either of both ends lies with the countries
involved, holding other things constant. This argument is not altogether new as similar issues emerged after the
economic depression of the 1930s (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2009). However, the 2008 global economic crisis brought
another dimension to the issue, as new protectionist instruments were unfolded (Evenett, 2011, 2014). Some stud-
ies noted that the recent protectionist action of countries can be traced to their retaliatory tendencies (Boffa &
Olarreaga, 2012). Others noted that the global financial crisis of 2008 can be blamed because the period
witnessed a number of industry collapses as a result of the reduction in demand for goods. However, we
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observed that beyond this, the level of economic growth, trade openness and institutional development of coun-
tries can determine the extent to which they engage in protectionist actions.
From the above backdrop, this study examines the factors that can inform a country’s decision to engage in
more of free trade tenets or protectionist actions. It engages the data from the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database
on protection, World Development Indicators (WDI) and World Trade Indicators (WTI), which was analysed using
descriptive, statistical and econometric techniques. Part of our findings includes that a country’s level of economic
growth is not a crucial factor for engaging in trade protection; however, as a country’s institutional quality
improves, the less the involvement in protection. This implies that a country’s magnitude of protection is deter-
mined by the level of its institutional development.
The remainder of the paper is distributed as follows: the next section gives brief insights from extant studies
and analytical underpinnings; the third section contains methods of analysis and the empirical model, while the
fourth section discusses the empirical results. The last section highlights the summary of major findings and the
conclusion.
2. Literature review and analytical underpinnings
Trade is essential to a country’s growth and development (David & Scott, 2005; Dollar, 1992; Sachs & Warner,
1995; Winters, 2004; Winters & Mackay, 2004). Krugman (1983) and Bhagwati (2004) further suggest that global
trade has positive effects on economic development, particularly in the area of employment generation, poverty
reduction, income re-distribution and economic growth. The trade theory of Helpman and Krugman (1985) and
the new growth theory of Grossman and Helpman (1991), postulate that the gains realised from trade make trade
a significant tool for economic growth. Srinivasan (2000) and Stiglitz (2002) further averred that trade brought
about significant incentives for developing countries. Maruping (2005) went on to explain that through trade,
regional integration can effectively perform their roles in enhancing competition and providing access to the glo-
bal market.
To advance the benefit from trade, there is the need for trade liberalisation. Trade liberalisation (otherwise
called free trade) refers to the absence of restrictions on the import and export of goods and services between
countries, or a laissez-faire approach to international trade. It requires the integration of nations through a com-
mon market for the exchange of goods and services, veering closely towards globalisation (Maruping, 2005; Tilat,
2002). Free trade has its benefits, which include welfare rise, as a result of falling rate of tariff due to increasing
imports (Ornelas & Turner, 2011); enhancement of a country’s economic growth and development (Grossman &
Helpman, 1991; Maruping, 2005; Srinivasan, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002). Despite the attractiveness of free trade, it has its
adverse effects on the economy of a country. For instance, Tilat (2002) notes that trade has no significant relation-
ship with long-term economic growth. He proffered that in the short-run, the negative effects of free trade out-
weigh its benefits. Winters and Mackay (2004) from their study also deduced that trade liberalisation is harmful
to the poor in the short-run, while in the long-run, open economies may still find themselves falling below the
poverty line.
Contrary implications of free trade on the economy could cause protection by countries (Bhagwati, 2009).
Protection depicts an attempt by the government of a country to impose or enact restrictions on the exchange of
goods and services with other countries of the world (George, 1949; Osabuohien, et al., 2014). The philosophy
underlining protection is that regulation of international trade is vital to ensuring that markets function properly,
which emanates from the fact that market inefficiencies can impede the benefits of international trade; thus, the
need to provide ways of mitigating such inefficiencies (Osabuohien et al., 2017). Some instruments used for
Protection include: tariffs, export subsidies, quotas, embargoes, exchange controls, import licencing, voluntary
export restraint arrangements, and intellectual property laws such as patents and copyrights (Datt, Hoekman, &
Malouche, 2011; Evenett, 2011, 2014).
Justifications proposed for employing protectionist measures include: infant industry argument, import dump-
ing, externalities, market failures and import controls, and non-economic reasons. Infant industry argument is one
of the most widely adopted theories in support of protection (George, 1949). The belief here is that if foreign
companies are allowed to be part owners of some industries, the competition will be too high for the survival of
infant industries. Furthermore, through protection, importation of de-merit goods such as alcohol, tobacco and
narcotic drugs that have adverse effects can be controlled using high tariffs or imposing a ban (George, 1949).
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Protection is deemed harmful to consumers as both tariff and non-tariff barriers impose taxes on the domestic
consumers, usually through regressive means, thereby hurting the poor most. It imposes tariffs on products con-
sumed by low-income households, thereby encouraging income inequality. It also creates market distortions,
which take place in the form of higher prices for goods and services, and reduction in market access for pro-
ducers. Furthermore, protection can introduce production inefficiencies as domestic firms that enjoy protection
from competition may have a lackadaisical attitude towards reducing production costs. It can promote negative
multiplier effects where trade disputes adversely affect trade volumes, leading to negative outcomes for countries.
Another argument against protection is that it may trigger higher taxes and higher prices by imposing a double
burden on tax payers and consumers. It can instigate trade wars in the form of retaliatory actions among coun-
tries (Boffa & Olarreaga, 2012).
This study is not interested in choosing sides as to which is better (free trade or protectionist action), but how
countries’ varying national interests with international trade protocols can instigate protectionist actions.
Stemming from the above, this study epitomises the underpinning factor that influences countries’ tilting towards
greater protection or less protection. This is shown in Figure 1.
From Figure 1, the more diverse the national interest is to international protocol, the more protective measures
a country will impose with a view to bolstering the interests of the citizenry as against adhering to international
guidelines. Segment C in Figure 1 portends this. For instance, a country facing a state of emergency can decide
to protect to ensure the capacity of local industries to produce crucial goods; ensuring redistribution of income;
fostering a conducive competitive environment for infant industry operations, and job creation among others.
These are some of the national policies, which may not be captured in international protocols. Based on this
divergence, a country can decide to protect. On the other hand, the closely related a country’s national interest is
to international protocols, the less protective the country will be and as a result, the less restrictive trade will
become, which occurs in segment A.
It is important to note that a country’s national interest will differ from the focus of international protocols
or agreements because the latter seeks the general welfare of all the constituting members, while the former
is focussed on the citizenry, whose interest the national leaders have ‘sworn’ to uphold. Further, international
agreements are more encompassing based on the number of countries involved, and may entail broader
issues relating to more bundles of goods and services without considering specific issues relating to individual
countries. Therefore, a country’s decision to glide from segment A to C or vice versa will depend on a num-
ber of factors such as the level of growth in the country, the institutional development and trade perform-
ance, besides the anticipated costs and benefits (Osabuohien & Efobi, 2011, 2013; Osabuohien, Efobi, & Gitau,
2013).
The level of growth in the country can reduce protectionist actions as growth bridges the inequality gap in
the distribution of income, which is one of the main arguments for protection (Coughlin, Chrystal, & Wood,
1988). This implies that a country may not have the need to engage in protective actions when its economic
growth improves. Segments B and D have same connotation as moderate protection will occur given inter-
national agreement and low national interest, and vice versa. Another reason is that some of the protective
measures are revenue sources to national governments. In effect, revenues from such actions (e.g. import
duties) are significant components of their national income. Thus, to jettison them in ‘the name of free trade’
is to lose a large proportion of revenue base. Even from the global trade point of view, the duties were as
much as 13.52% and contributed to 10.68%, 10.70% and 14.10% of the tax revenues in Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) regions, respectively
(World Bank, 2016).
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Figure 1. Free trade-trade protection nexus (national interest versus international protocols).
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3. Methods of analysis and empirical model
This study engages econometric technique in achieving its objectives. It formulates an empirical model that
expresses a country’s tendency to protect as a function of explanatory variables such as: institutional quality, infra-
structural quality, economic growth, and trade balance. The dependent variable was obtained from the content
analysis of the Global Trade Alert (GTA) data set. The GTA dataset documents policies by countries, which are
likely to hamper the operations of global free trade. The dataset covers the period 2009–2012, and documents
real-time policies of countries relating to their trade policies. It includes trade policies relating to the following:
tariff and non-tariff measures, public procurement and policies on migration, export subsidy and other service sec-
tor, trade defence measure, Sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures, consumption subsidy, public procure-
ment, intellectual property protection, technical barriers to trade (TBT), investment measure, import ban, state
trading enterprise, local content requirement, export subsidies, bail out, import licences, quota, competitive
devaluation, trade finance and sub-national government measures. This study used a sample of 107 countries
based on their engagement in at least one form of protective measure during the period of study. The list of the
sampled countries is in the Appendix 1.
The GTA dataset provides information on contemporary protection actions and these actions are categorised
into three colours (Red, Amber and Green). The Red includes measures already implemented that may involve dis-
crimination or have been announced or under consideration, but if implemented will certainly restrict trade.
Amber involves measures that are implemented/already announced and if implemented the resultant impact on
trade is not certain. The Green includes measures that have been announced/implemented that support free
trade. This study categorised measures for red and amber as protection. Evenett (2011) used a similar approach
to evaluate the extent of trade tensions mounting as a result of the global financial crises.
This study observes that a country will -likely engage in protectionist activities when its national interest takes
paramount priority over past international or regional treaties and trade agreements. Basically, the study proposes
that institutional factors and economic growth amongst others can explain the countries’ tendencies to engage in
protective actions. This implies that the possibility that country ‘Yi’ will engage in a protectionist action (Yi > 0)
or not (Yi = 0) is given by:
P Yi ¼ 1=yð Þ ¼ Pi if y ¼ 01Pi if y > 0

(1)
where Pi is the probability that country ‘i’ decides not to put in place a protectionist measure that can hinder
free trade based on a set of covariates Xit for which the linear relationship can be expressed using a logistic
regression framework. Thus, Equation (2):
Logit Pitð Þ ¼ ln 1PitPit
 
¼ Xita (2)
In this equation, a is a vector of parameters to be estimated, while Xit is a combination of the explanatory vari-
ables, which include the quality of institutions, infrastructure development, economic growth variables as well as
dummy variables signifying the founding members of the WTO, developing countries and African countries.
Explicitly, the econometric model developed for this study is expressed in Equation (3) as;
P ðYit ¼ 1=yÞ ¼ b0i þ b1Edevit þ b2Infrait þ b3Instqit þ b4Trdintit þ b5dumJiþlit (3)
The probability of a country engaging in protective action, measured as a categorical variable. One (1) was
attributed to a country with high rate of protective measure and zero (0) if otherwise. A country is regarded as
having a high measure of protection if in a particular year the protective measure engaged by the country is
above the simple average of the total measures engaged by the countries reported in the GTA dataset. The sim-
ple average was first computed by dividing the total measures of all protective actions taken by all the countries
in a particular year by the number of countries reported in that year. Then the number of measures taken by
each country was compared with the average and any country with protective measures more than the sample
average was categorised as 1 and otherwise as 0 for the period (2009–2010)1. This is summarised in Table 1.
From Table 1, countries with average measures that are 7 in 2009 are categorised as 1 (0, otherwise), while
in 2010, countries with average measures that are 6 are categorised as 1 (0, otherwise). The reason for establish-
ing this cut-off point is that countries that have average measures greater than the global average measure can
46 E. S. OSABUOHIEN ET AL.
be said to have relatively high tendencies for protection. The above dichotomisation approach is with a view to
apply an analysis that deals with categorical dependent variables such as logistic regression. A similar approach
(though with trade relations) has been used by Kim and Shin (2002) within the context of Social Network Analysis
to explain longitudinal data on international commodity trade between 105 countries (1959-1996) using cut-off
points of USD 1 million and USD 10 million.
The independent variables include:
Egrw: economic growth measured as GDP growth rate (gdpgrw).
Infra: infrastructural development measured as logistics performance index (logistics). The logistics measures the
performance of the country with regards to trade logistics as reflected in the overall logistic index, showing
the average of the country scores on the efficiency of the clearance process. This includes border control
agencies (e.g. customs), the quality of trade and transport related infrastructures (e.g. rail, road, information
technology), ease of arranging competitively priced shipments, competence and quality of logistics services,
ability to track and trace consignments, and the timeliness of shipments (World Bank, 2016). The value
ranges from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest)2.
Instq: institutional quality, which captures the quality of institution in a country. As reported in the World
Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank (2015), there are six indicators including: government effect-
iveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), voice and accountability (VA), rule of law (RL), political stability and
absence of violence (PS), and control of corruption (CC). However, this study used four of them (GE, RQ, RL
and PS) as they provide insight on the process of international relations especially with third party dealings.
The data were obtained from WGI. These indicators are standardised on a scale from -2.5 (lowest) toþ2.5
(highest). Other indicators of Instq engaged are from Freedom House (2015), namely: political rights (PR)
and civil liberties (CL). The choice of PR and CL is to complement those of WGI and, most importantly, it
covers a recent period (2009 and 2010 inclusive). The original values range from 1 (highest degree of free-
dom) to 7 (the least). However, this study transformed the data such that higher values indicate better
institutional quality. This is to aid interpretation of results as all other variables are in ascending order.
Trdopn: trade openness measured as the net export to GDP [i.e. (X-M)/GDP].
DumJ: dummy variables (with superscript ‘J’¼ 1–3), which include: (1) WTO founding member (WTOfnmb) dicho-
tomised as 1 for countries that are WTO members since inception in 1995 and 0 otherwise as reported in
WTO (2012). (2) Developing country dummy (Developing) as derived using United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD, 2012) classification base to assign 1 if a country is a developing econ-
omy and 0 otherwise. (3) African countries (Africdum) obtained by assigning 1 to African countries and 0 to
non-African countries.
This study engaged data for 107 countries and an African sample comprising 25 countries. This sample is as
informed by the GTA dataset. Other sources of data are World Development Indicators (WDI). The analysis was
carried out with the aid of STATA 13 software.
4. Results and discussions
The econometric analysis reports the results obtained from the logistic regression for the estimation of
Equation (3). The results are reported in Table 2, using indicators of economic growth and other explanatory vari-
ables, accordingly.
From Table 2, the test statistics presented in the last segments such as the Pseudo R2 and their various prob-
ability values were statistically significant. This underscores that the chosen explanatory variables were jointly sig-
nificant in explaining the likelihood of a country engaging more in protective actions. This means that the
estimations can be relied upon for useful inference.
Table 1. Dichotomisation of the dependent variable.
Year Number of protective measures Number of countries Simple average
2009 615 86 7.15 measures
2010 606 106 6.00 measures
Source: The Authors.
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A close investigation of Table 2 reveals mixed signs as in columns I–IV, the GDP growth was negative, while in
columns V–X it was positive. However, it was not significant in any of the columns. This suggests that a country’s
economic growth will not necessarily create or induce her tendency to protect. This picture becomes clearer on
the examination of the developing country dummy in the Table, as the variable had a positive value, which was
not significant at 10%. This finding supports that of Tilat (2002) where it is argued that trade relations and eco-
nomic growth may have no significant relationship. Similarly, Milner, Yoffie, and Spring (1989) noted that the lev-
els of economic condition are not necessarily the reason for countries’ protective actions as a country will tend to
engage in a protective action not necessarily because of the buoyancy of its economy but other interest. More
evidently was the scenario from the global financial crises, where countries at different levels of growth were
engaged in protectionist actions (Datt et al., 2011). Thus, it could be said that there are other salient factors that
will tend to make a country engage in protective measures other than its economic growth.
In view of this, we went further to investigate other explanatory variables, which are reported in Table 2. Most
importantly, the respective institutional variables using those of WGI (PS, GE, RQ, RL) and Freedom House (Pr and
Cl) were all negatively signed, indicating that countries with weaker institutions tend to relatively protect more
than those with stronger institutions. This is re-echoed as almost all the indicators of institutional variables in the
Table were statistically significant at 1% and 5%. This denotes that institutional quality in a country is a crucial
determining factor in the relativity of a country’s inclination towards protection. This can be justified considering
that the quality of a country’s institutions will be able to guide and guard its economic activities without resorting
to external protectionist mechanisms. A further investigation of the components of the institutional quality varia-
bles using WGI reveals that government effectiveness (GE) is most relevant in determining the likelihood of a
country’s protection, followed by rule of law (RL), regulatory quality (RQ) and political stability (PS). These institu-
tional measures are able to deter against moral hazard that can likely arise from free trade. Thus, an improvement
in these categories of institutions will result in a decrease in protectionist actions.
The indicator for infrastructural development was positive and significant in all the columns with the exception
of column VIII and IX. This suggests that infrastructural development in the country with regards to its logistic
Table 2. Logistic regression.
Dependent variable: tendency of country engaging in protective action
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Egrw 0.0346
(0.323)
0.009
(0.802)
0.005
(0.893)
0.020
(0.602)
0.013
(0.732)
0.018
(0.633)
0.001
(0.974)
0.029
(0.422)
0.040
(0.252)
0.004
(0.925)
Trdopn 3.415b
(0.064)
4.089b
(0.031)
3.709c
(0.051)
2.999
(0.110)
2.997
(0.107)
2.687
(0.142)
2.535
(0.159)
3.563c
(0.067)
3.216c
(0.083)
2.929
(0.117)
Logisticsov 0.644c
(0.051)
1.538a
(0.001)
3.033a
(0.000)
2.616a
(0.000)
3.030a
(0.000)
0.968b
(0.014)
1.241a
(0.003)
0.425
(0.232)
0.531
(0.131)
1.001b
(0.015)
Ps 0.996a
(0.000)
Ge 1.722a
(0.000)
Rq 1.502a
(0.000)
Rl 1.544a
(0.000)
Pr 0.155
(0.147)
Cl 0.342b
(0.014)
wtofnmb 0.768c
(0.072)
africdum 0.526
(0.368)
developing 0.813
(0.113)
Cons 3.034a
(0.005)
5.874a
(0.000)
9.846a
(0.000)
8.563a
(0.000)
10.002a
(0.000)
3.203a
(0.004)
3.041a
(0.006)
2.880a
(0.009)
2.614b
(0.024)
4.533a
(0.002)
Pseudo R2 0.068a
(0.003)
0.152a
(0.000)
0.169a
(0.000)
0.166a
(0.000)
0.157a
(0.000)
0.076a
(0.003)
0.096a
(0.000)
0.084a
(0.001)
0.072a
(0.004)
0.080a
(0.002)
Log likelihood 99.041 90.054 87.786 88.091 88.999 97.554 95.437 97.330 98.617 97.728
Note: Probability values are in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b and c represent significant at 1, 5 and 10%.
The lag of Egrw was also included as a further robust check. The results (not reported) were not statistically different from the ones presented in Table 2.
Source: Authors’ computation.
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performance has a bearing on its tendency to protect, implying that the better the country’s infrastructure in
terms of logistics performance, the higher the likelihood to engage in protective actions. This is expected as coun-
tries with better infrastructure are already being ‘patronised’ by other countries in terms of trade relations
because better infrastructure reduces the costs of international trade. In this regard, a country can afford to be
fearless and engage in protectionist actions, bearing in mind that the relating country may not back out because
of the attendant low cost incurred in their trade relations. This is unlike a country with poor infrastructural facili-
ties, which hitherto has been experiencing ‘epileptic’ trade relations with other countries because of the high cost
of trading experienced by their trading partners. Such a country may not have the will power to engage in pro-
tective actions.
The trade openness (trdopen) variable was significant and positive in most of the columns, giving a kind of
scenario that the more a country is open to trade, the more likely it is to protect. A reason for this scenario is
that when a country trades more, it has more to offer in terms of export in the world market and take conscious
actions to engage in protection in her favour. The series of trade litigation involving US, Russia, China, India and
Mexico among others are handy testimonies in this regard (ICTSD, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). Some of these actions
could be retaliatory or otherwise (Baldwin & Evenett, 2009; Boffa & Olarreaga, 2012; Datt et al., 2011). In order to
avoid this, a country that is more open to trade will engage in protective acts to minimise their risk from trading.
This speaks for divergence in national interest and international protocols because countries’ national interest will
involve improving their trade potential and market for their products while reducing the import of substitute
products from other countries. The latter is a breach of free trade agreements with other countries.
The dummy for WTO founding members was positive and significant. This suggests that founding members of
WTO will be inclined to protect more than non-founding members. This speaks to the fact that founding mem-
bers have more domineering influence vis-a-vis a likelihood to protect. Extant occurrences since the global finan-
cial crises support this assertion as regular protectionist actions are facilitated by the founding members of WTO
such as China, Germany and USA. The Africa and Developing country dummy was not significant in explaining
the relationship.
5. Conclusions
One of the core objectives for regional cooperation of countries is to boost mutual benefits among members
especially with respect to trade. This is encapsulated in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and various protocols
of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), and is particularly evidenced as the cumulative RTAs across the world
between 1990 and 2011 have tripled. However, despite this ‘gospel’ of free trade, Global Trade Alert (GTA) reports
a variety of protective measures that have been initiated by many countries, who are signatories to WTO as well
as a number of RTAs. This is a contradiction which forms one of the motivations for this study, which is to exam-
ine the factors that can influence a country’s gliding towards free trade or protection. From the analyses, the
main findings of the study are summarised herein.
The study found that as a country’s institutional quality improves; the less likely they are to engage in protec-
tion. This is justified given that a country’s domestic institutions such as the quality of regulation, rule of law, and
effectiveness of the government will be able to guide and guard the economic activities of the country, intimat-
ing less reliance on external mechanism. This is evinced from a phenomenon where countries known to have
internal security challenges usually have stringent policies: immigration policies, for instance.
Furthermore, the level of infrastructural development in the country with regards to the logistic performance
has some influence on the tendency of a country to engage in protective actions. This means that as a country’s
infrastructure improves, the higher the likelihood to engage in trade protection. Furthermore, it was observed
that trade openness was positive and statistically significant suggesting that the more a country engages in trade,
the higher the tendency to protect. This is because, as a country trades more (both export and import), it tends
to have more stakes in the world market and will be more vigilant with respect to guiding against possible trade
losses, while at the same time maximising trade benefits. This is not far-fetched as countries known to be major
players in the global trading arena are also regular complainants of trade cases.
Examining the WTO founding member dummy, the variable had a positive significant influence on the ten-
dency to engage in protection. This implies that the founding members of WTO will tend to be more protective
than others because they are more likely to have domineering influence than others. In conclusion, there will
always be an inclination by countries to engage in some form of protective measure in order to safeguard the
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interests of their citizenry. This is as a result of the consistent differences between countries’ national interests
and the contents of international trade protocols. Thus, the less synchronised countries’ national interests are to
international protocols, the more the tendency to protect, which will make the free trade-protection debate to
remain a contention. The influence of countries’ institutional quality is pivotal in this process.
As suggestion for future studies, there is the need to focus on extending the periodicity of the data, and re-
examining the issues to understand the influence of recent dynamics on the result of this paper. Our data source
was based on the initial version of GTA. The latest version of GTA will be released in 2018, which will allow for a
wide span for data analysis in future studies. Thus, a relatively long panel data will give the latitude of analyzing
the issue beyond logistic regression to using other econometric techniques such as generalized method of
moments (GMM) that can adequately address possible issue of endogeneity.
Notes
1. Hence, this study used 2009 and 2010 to have the same period for both the measure of protection and the explanatory
variables. This differs markedly from Boffa and Olarreaga (2012), who related data from GTA covering measures between
November 2008 and December 2010 to averages of explanatory variables from 2004 to 2006.
2. Efforts were made to include other indicators of infrastructure such as: paved roads, electricity power consumption,
telecommunication usage (internet, telephone and personal computer users per 100 persons), however, data on them
were not available for most of the countries in 2009 and 2010 in WDI.
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Appendix 1. List of sampled countries
They include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea,
Kuwait, and Kyrgyz Republic. Other are: Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Northern Island, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippine, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sudan (before the creation South Sudan), Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkey, United Arab Emirate, Uganda, United Kingdom, Ukraine, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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